result'' in the sense that one would be informed of the In choice between uncertain options, uncertainty outcome obtained for the chosen alternative: The value may be eventually resolved for all options, or just for of the stock one invested in or the data related to effithe chosen option. The findings described here demon-ciency subsequent to implementation of the efficiency strate that preference between uncertain options is measure. However, the two decision problems differ systematically affected by expectations concerning with respect to the extent of uncertainty resolution. In uncertainty resolution: Prospects which are less likely stock investment, one invariably knows both the value to yield worse outcome than the alternative are seof the chosen share and those of the alternative shares lected more often when all options are to be resolved one had considered. In implementing procedural (complete resolution). Two experiments examined changes designed to achieve better efficiency, one selchoice between statistically independent lotteries for which the chances of being worse off with the low-risk dom knows for certain what would have happened had alternative were nearly as high, or higher than the one chosen differently. The present study is designed chances of being worse-off with the high-risk alterna-to examine the hypothesis that anticipation of uncertive. For these gamble pairs it was found that subjects tainty resolution for all alternatives in the choice set, as who expected complete resolution chose the high-risk opposed to resolution of the chosen option only, affects high-gain option more often than subjects who ex-preferences among some options, due to the probability pected only their selected gamble to be resolved. A of regret.
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third experiment suggests that the preference changes
Recent research provides some evidence for experidue to resolution are related to the probability of the enced regret, associated with comparing the outcomes low-risk gamble yielding the worse obtained outcome.
The results are interpreted as compatible with the hy-of the chosen and unchosen alternatives. Boles and pothesis that in choosing between uncertain options, Messick (1995) show that the judged goodness of an people are more inclined to compare outcomes per outcome is closely related to the alternative outcome. states of the world if they expect to learn what would Thus, a winner in one gamble was judged to be less have happened with each option. In those cases, the satisfied than a loser in another gamble, if the winner outcome of a foregone option is more likely to serve would have won more with the alternative, and the as a salient comparison point for evaluating the outloser would have lost more. Similarly, Baron and Ritov come of the selected option. An alternative explana- (1994) found that comparison to the alternative outtion is also discussed. ᭧ 1996 Academic Press, Inc.
come affected rating of the decision maker's emotions, as well as judgment of the choice's advisability. In parMany decision problems one faces, in real life as well ticular, the bias toward omission was greater when the as in laboratory experiments, involve a choice between act led to the worse of the alternative outcomes, even two or more uncertain alternatives. Whether one when this outcome represented a gain relative to the chooses to invest in a specific share in the stock market, previous status quo. or one makes a managerial decision in favor of applying If people are aware of the possibility of experiencing one efficiency measure over another, one normally ex-regret, it seems plausible to assume that they would pects to find out what the result of the choice will be. take this into consideration when making decisions Indeed, in both these examples, one would ''know the whose outcomes are uncertain. Indeed, according to Regret Theory, anticipation of the expost experience afThe author thanks Jonathan Baron, Jane Beattie, Barbara Mellers, fects choice between two uncertain alternatives (Bell, and an anonymous reviewer for helpful comments. Address corre-1982; Loomes & Sugden, 1982 choice between A 1 and A 2 should be the same in all three cases. Contrary to this prediction, the present study will demonstrate that subjects' choice between constructed. Originally Regret Theory has been con-two statistically independent lotteries is systematically fined only to those decisions in which complete resolu-affected by whether or not they expect both lotteries to tion is expected (Bell, 1982) . However, as noted earlier, be eventually resolved. complete information concerning the consequences of Although A 1 and A 2 are statistically independent in each option in all states of the world is not always all three situations detailed above, the ex post evaluaavailable. In order to apply Regret Theory in those tion of outcomes may be different in those situations. cases where state-contingent consequences are not de-Indeed, some recent studies (Ritov and Baron, 1995) fined, it has been assumed that the options can be suggest that the evaluation of the same outcome subtreated as statistically independent. It has further been stantially varies, depending on whether or not the outproposed that choosing between statistically indepen-come of the unchosen option is known. In particular, dent options for which state-contingent consequences acts leading to bad outcomes were judged worse than are not defined is the same as choosing between statis-omissions leading to identical outcomes, provided that tically independent options for which all state-continonly the outcome of the selected option was known. gent consequences are defined (Loomes & Sugden, When all outcomes were known, if the outcome of the 1987).
foregone option was better than the outcome of the To illustrate how preference may be affected by poselected option, commission was judged better than tential regret, imagine that one has to choose between omission, and the order reversed if the foregone optwo prospects, A 1 and A 2 , of similar expected value. A 1 tion's outcome was worse than the obtained outcome. offers G 1 , with probability p 1 (otherwise zero), and A 2 Ritov and Baron interpreted the above result as sugoffers G 2 , with probability p 2 (otherwise zero). The two gesting that the degree of resolution (partial vs comprospects are said to be statistically independent if the plete) determines the reference points for evaluation of probability of each prospect yielding a gain, given that the obtained outcome. In partial resolution, the obthe other prospect yielded a gain, is the same as the tained outcome is likely to be compared to a preexisting unconditional probability. Thus, in each of the followstatus quo, or, perhaps to some expected outcome. ing situations A 1 and A 2 are statistically independent:
When uncertainty is resolved for all options, however, (a) The outcomes of A 1 and A 2 depend upon separate the obtained outcome of the unchosen alternative and independent lotteries. Only the lottery correspondserves as a salient comparison point. ing to the chosen prospect will be played out. (b) The
The findings of Ritov and Baron (1995) suggest that outcomes of A 1 and A 2 depend upon separate and indepostresolution evaluation of outcomes in choice bependent lotteries. Both lotteries will be played out. (c) tween gambles may differ, depending upon whether or The outcomes of both A 1 and A 2 depend upon a single not both gambles are resolved. Feelings about the aclottery, with the state/consequence matrix given in Tatual outcome are likely to be affected by comparison ble 1.
to the outcome of the unchosen alternative, in those Consider, as an example, a choice between gamble situations where both outcomes obtain. Consequently, A 1 , which offers 80% chance of winning $18 (otherwise if anticipated regret affects choice, preference between zero), and A 2 , which offers 50% chance of winning $29 gambles in a given pair may vary, depending upon (otherwise zero). Each gamble could be resolved by whether one expects resolution of both gambles, or just drawing a ball from an urn containing marked and the chosen one. Consider, once again, the choice beunmarked balls. The price will be won if a marked ball tween gamble A 1 which offers 80% chance of winning is drawn from the urn. The urn corresponding to A 1 18, and gamble A 2 which offers 50% chance of winning contains 80% marked balls, and the one corresponding 29. The gamble with the higher probability of winning to A 2 contains 50% marked balls. Situation (a) will be realized if a ball is drawn only from the urn correspond-(A 1 , in this example) is often referred to as the ''P bet,'' sen (as well as chosen) alternative leads low self-esteem subjects to make more risk averse choices.
State-Contingent Consequences for the Choice between A 1 (80% Chance to Win $18) and A 2 (50% Chance to Win $29)
Zeelenberg, Beattie, van der Pligt, and de Vries (1996) point out that risk aversion has often been con- for regret minimizing, rather than risk averse choices, under expectation of complete resolution, has also been demonstrated by Larrick and Boles (1995) , who studied and the other member of the gamble pair, which offers the impact of feedback expectations in negotiation. In a lower probability of winning a higher price (A 2 , in this their study negotiators who expected feedback on the example) is referred to as the ''$ bet.'' In experimental foregone alternative were more risk seeking. The ausettings employing partial resolution, subjects have of-thors interpret this result as an indication of regret ten expressed preference for the P bet over the equal aversion: anticipation of uncertainty resolution of all expected value $ bet. Thus, the difference between the options entails a possibility of regret. 80 and 50% chances of winning seems more salient
Complete resolution of all options grants the possibilthan the difference between the corresponding poten-ity of regret. Yet the likelihood of experiencing regret tial gains.
varies, depending on the options in the choice set. Imagine now, the same two independent gambles, in Hence, change in preference due to anticipation of comthe complete resolution setting described earlier. Table  plete resolution for both options would depend upon 2 presents the state-contingent consequences for this the specific parameters employed. In order to make choice. Anticipation of complete resolution, as has been exact predictions for all values of the parameters, one argued above, changes the subjective evaluation of any needs to have a detailed utility model, pertaining to particular outcome by having it compared to the alterthe weighting of both outcomes and probabilities. The native outcome, under each possible state of the world. present paper does not aim at developing such a model. Thus, winning 18, in the example above, may be posiInstead, it will draw upon earlier findings to suggest tively evaluated when it is paired with a foregone win possible parameter ranges in which reversals due to of 0 (in state I), but it is likely to produce a less positive anticipated resolution may occur. evaluation when paired with a foregone gain of 29 (in Extensive research on subjective evaluation of outstate III). Similarly, the subjective value of winning comes (i.e., Tversky & Kahneman, 1991; Tversky & zero, in gamble A 1 varies, depending upon whether the Kahneman, 1992) suggests that people are particularly foregone gamble won 18 or 0. As choice between gamaversive to losses relative to their reference point. bles depends upon the subjective value of expected outThus, to the extent that the outcome of the foregone comes, as well as the weighting of probabilities, the option serves as a natural reference point, regret over overall utility of gamble A1 and gamble A2 may be obtaining a lower outcome than the foregone option will different, in this case, from the utilities calculated unloom larger than rejoicing over obtaining the higher der partial resolution. of the two outcomes. Given the notable asymmetry, it The impact of anticipating resolution, in itself, reseems plausible to assume that preference between two ceived little attention in previous research until quite gambles, both of which are expected to be resolved, recently. One study which did test for the effect of resowould be substantially affected by a desire to avoid lution expectations (Kelsey & Schepanski, 1991) failed regret. Hence, under these circumstances, the probabilto demonstrate a significant effect of anticipated resoity of obtaining the worse of the two outcomes is likely lution on choice. Kelsey and Schepanski, however, to play a major role. In order to illustrate the effect of tested only choice between a ''sure thing'' and a risky anticipated regret consider, once more, the indepenprospect. In their study, choice of the risky prospect dent gambles described in Table 1 . If G 1 õ G 2 , gamble was always followed by complete resolution. Hence it A 1 yields a worse outcome than gamble A 2 in both state is unclear whether the lack of resolution effect in their II and state III. The combined probability of these two study could be directly extended to choice between two states is p 2 . State I is the only state of the world in gambles. Josephs, Larrick, Steele, and Nisbett (1992) showed that expectations about feedback on an uncho-which A 2 yields a worse outcome than A 1 . The probabil-ity of obtaining this state is p 1 *(1 0 p 2 ). If p 2 ú p 1 *(1 avoidance would lead to different (contradictory) choices. If, on the other hand, the same gamble would 0 p 2 ) then the probability of regret with gamble A 1 is minimize both perceived risk and probability of anticihigher than the probability of regret with gamble A 2 . pated regret, complete resolution is not expected to afNaturally, there is a quantitative aspect to the expefect preference in a systematic way. This hypothesis is rience of regret: a larger (negative) difference between tested in Experiment 3. Experiment 3 replicated the obtained and alternative outcomes is likely to generate basic design of Experiment 2, while varying the values more regret than a smaller difference. However, for of the probability parameter. In addition to the set of the present study we adopt the clearly oversimplified pairs used in Experiment 2, another set of pairs was assumption that the decision maker is concerned most presented, in which the probability of regret in selectwith avoiding regret, and the absolute value of the ing the $ bet was considerably higher than the probamonetary difference between the obtained and foregone bility of regret in selecting the P bet. The effect of resooutcomes is considered less important. Under this aslution on preferences among those pairs is expected to sumption preference for A 1 over A 2 should be deterbe greatly reduced (relative to its effect in the original mined primarily by comparing p 1 *(1 0 p 2 ) and p 2 . For set of pairs). instance, consider, once again, the choice presented earlier, between a gamble which offers 80% chance of EXPERIMENT 1 winning 18 (the P bet), and another gamble which offers 50% chance of winning 29 (the $ bet). For this pair, This questionnaire study compares choices between one would predict that the attractiveness of the P bet pairs of gambles which depend either on a single lottery will decrease as the decision maker, anticipating comdraw, or on two separate independent lotteries. Since plete resolution, will come to realize that in selecting no lottery is actually played, no gamble will eventually this bet he faces 50% chance of regretting his choice, be resolved. However, the mechanism of resolution in while selecting the $ bet entails only 40% chance of the single-lottery condition entails that both gambles regret.
must be resolved simultaneously. Under this condition In the following three experiments, subjects were one can easily imagine that as the outcomes obtain, presented with a series of pairs of gambles with similar the outcome of the foregone alternative will be as saexpected values. For each pair, subjects indicated lient (or nearly as salient) as the outcome of the chosen which gamble they would prefer to own. In Experiment alternative. In contrast, under the separate lotteries 1, the gambles involved either a single lottery or two condition, only the outcome of the chosen alternative separate lotteries. Although neither lottery was played will obtain. As the chances for being better-off with the out in this experiment, the single lottery presentation $ bet are nearly as high, or even higher than the ensures that had the lottery been played out, both gamchances of being better-off with the P bet in the three bles would have been resolved simultaneously. In Expairs used here, the $ bets are expected to be more periment 2 each gamble is represented by a separate attractive in the complete resolution (single lottery) lottery. In one condition, subjects are presented with condition. the resolution of both lotteries after making each choice, while in the second condition subjects are preMethod sented only with the outcome of the lottery of their choice.
Subjects were 108 industrial engineering students at In both Experiment 1 and Experiment 2 the list of Ben-Gurion University, who volunteered to participate gambles included only pairs for which, under complete in this experiment. The experiment was run during resolution, the P bet entailed nearly as high (or even regular class sessions. Subjects were randomly ashigher) probability of obtaining the worse outcome as signed to the two conditions. the $ bet. Thus, the probability of regretting having Three pairs of gambles were used, with expected valselected the P bet is roughly the same as the probability ues ranging between 8 and 12.5 shekels. The gambles of regret over a $ bet selection. Previous research sug-were presented in the form of boxes containing marked gests that under partial resolution, subjects will tend balls. In the single-lottery (complete resolution) verto prefer the P bet over the $ bet. It follows from the sion, each choice concerned one box. The 20 balls conabove discussion that for the pairs included in Experi-tained in this box were marked in two different ways. ments 1 and 2 preference for P bets will diminish under Thus, if the probability of winning in the two gambles complete resolution.
was p 1 and p 2 , respectively, p 1 of the 20 balls were Finally, regret is expected to reverse preferences pri-painted gray (the others remaining white), and p 2 of the same 20 balls were marked by X's (the others remarily in those cases where regret avoidance and risk maining unmarked by X's). In order to keep the two In the two-lottery (partial resolution) version two boxes were used for each choice. One box contained gambles independent, the proportion of balls which were both painted gray and marked by X was exactly a proportion of p 1 gray painted balls (the other balls unpainted), and the second box contained a proportion p 1 *p 2 . Figure 1 presents an example of this display. A description of the gambles, in the form of lottery tick-of p 2 X-marked balls (the others unmarked). An example of such a pair appears in Fig. 1 . The same descripets, appeared below the box. The tickets were of the following format: Ticket A, drawing of a gray painted tion of lottery tickets was used as in the first version.
However, in choosing their preferred ticket, subjects ball guarantees a winning of Y skekels. Ticket B: drawing of an X-marked ball guarantees a winning of Z were asked to assume that only the chosen lottery will be played. shekels. Subjects were asked to indicate which of the two tickets they would prefer to own. The values of p 1 , Results p 2 , Y, and Z are given in Table 3 . Table 3 presents, for each pair of gambles, the percentage of subjects choosing the high-risk gamble in Experiment 2 provides this demonstration.
EXPERIMENT 2
values for the probability of winning. Each of these The present experiment elicits choices between gampairs of probability values was matched with three difbles which are consequently played out. Every subject ferent pairs of monetary values, thus generating the performs a series of choices between pairs of gambles, 12 pairs of gambles. The order of the pairs, as well each choice followed by a resolution procedure. Thus, as the left-right presentation within each pair were expectations concerning outcome information are likely randomized. The same random order was used in both to be formed. Anticipating the impact of outcome inforconditions. The complete list of pairs appears in Table  mation on satisfaction with one's choice may, in turn, 4, in the order of presentation. Subjects did not know affect preferences among gambles.
the sequence before making their choices. The two versions included in this experiment do not
The gambles were presented in the form of two boxes differ in the information presented at the choice stage: both the parameter values, the resolution mechanism, containing 10 balls, some red and the others yellow. The and the very format of the display are identical. The boxes were presented side by side on a computer screen. versions differ only in the resolution following each Below each box a statement indicated the amount that choice: In the complete resolution version both gambles would be gained should a red ball be drawn from the box. are played, whereas in the partial resolution version, Subjects, in both conditions, were asked to choose which only the chosen gamble is played. Hence, in making a gamble they would prefer to own, given that the outcome choice, the subject would anticipate learning either of of each gamble would be determined by a random drawboth outcomes (in the complete resolution version) or ing of one ball from the given box. only of the outcome of his chosen gamble (in the partial
In the complete resolution condition, after the subject resolution version). Those different expectations are made his choice, both lotteries were played out. The predicted to affect preference among the gambles. balls were seen bouncing around in the boxes, until one ball fell out of each box. A statement appearing on the Method screen below the boxes indicated the amount of money the subject won (if any), and the amount he would have Subjects were 32 industrial engineering graduate won had he chosen the other gamble. The program then students at Ben-Gurion University who volunteered to proceeded to present the next pair of gambles. The participate in this experiment. The experiment was run same procedure was used in the partial resolution conon a computer, in individual sessions. Subjects were dition, except that once a choice had been made, the randomly assigned to one of the two conditions, run on unchosen gamble was eliminated from the screen, and alternating sessions.
only the chosen gamble was played out. Accordingly, A list of 12 pairs of gambles of similar expected values was used. The list included 4 different pairs of the subject was then informed of his winning only.
Results
over a $ bet selection. If expectation of complete resolution makes potential regret more pertinent, then the Table 4 presents, for each pair of gambles, the per-effect of complete resolution on choices among gambles centage of subjects choosing the $ bet in each of the two should be more marked in the former than in the latter conditions. Although subjects were overall risk averse, type of pairs. preference was affected by the experimental manipulation: In all except the first (warm up) pair, the percent-Method age of subjects preferring the $ bet was higher in the complete resolution condition then in the partial resoForty-eight undergraduate psychology students at lution condition. The difference between the two condi-Ben-Gurion University participated in this study, as tions across the 12 pairs is significant: subjects pre-partial fulfillment of course requirement. As in Experiferred the $ bet in 5.2 pairs (out of 12) in the complete ment 2, the experiment was run on a computer, in indiresolution version and 2.8 pairs in the partial resolu-vidual sessions. Subjects were randomly assigned to tion version (t Å 2.24, p Å .03). Thus it seems that one of the four conditions. expecting to learn the outcome of both gambles made Two lists of 12 pairs of gambles of similar expected the high-risk, high-gain gamble seem more attractive. value were used. One list was identical to the list used
The results of the present experiment confirm the in Experiment 2. The second list was made up using prediction that for the pairs of gambles used here pref-the same P bets as in the first list, coupling each of erence for the $ bet is higher when complete resolution them with a new $ bet. The probability of winning in is anticipated. In all 12 pairs, the probability values those $ bets was either .2 or .3. These values ensure were chosen so as to make the probability of regret that the probability of having the better outcome occur over a P bet nearly as high, or even higher than the in the P bet is distinctly higher than the probability of probability of regret over a $ bet selection. It is clear, it occurring in the $ bet. The complete list of pairs is though, that the probability of regret by itself cannot given in Table 5 . predict preferences: percentages of subjects who chose
The presentation of the pairs was the same as that the $ bet in each gamble pair vary considerably.
1 Fur-in Experiment 2. The two presentation conditions were thermore, the results thus far do not preclude the possi-crossed with the two lists of gambles, to form a 2 1 2 bility that expecting complete resolution makes people between-subject design. more risk seeking in general, regardless of the specific probability of regret. Experiment 3 will test the hypoth-Results esis that the probability, rather than the mere possibility of regret, modifies the impact of resolution on choice. Table 5 presents, for each pair of gambles in each of This hypothesis will be tested by varying the values of the presentation conditions, the percentage of subjects probability of gain.
choosing the $ bet. The effect found in Experiment 2 was essentially replicated for the first set of pairs. For 10 of these pairs, preference for the $ bet was higher EXPERIMENT 3
in the complete resolution condition than in the singleoutcome condition. For the new set of gambles, howTwo types of gamble pairs are compared in this experiment, differing in the probability of regret, follow-ever, no distinct pattern emerges. The complete resolution condition yielded greater preference for the $ bet in ing resolution of both gambles: pairs in which the probability of regret over a P bet is nearly as high or higher 5 of the 12 pairs. Table 6 presents the average withinsubject number of $ bet choices (out of 12 choices), in than the probability of regret over a $ bet selection, and pairs in which the probability of regret over a P each experimental condition. Clearly, preference for the $ bet was higher in the two-outcome condition than bet is distinctly lower than the probability of regret in the single-outcome condition (p Å .017). However, the predicted interaction is also significant: The effect 1 In order to test whether the effect of resolution systematically of outcome information is stronger in the original set varies between the probability value pairs employed in this experiof gambles than in the new set (p õ .05). ment the following analysis was carried out. For each subject and each of the four probability pairs, the number of $ bet selections (out In addition to replicating the basic finding of Experiof three possible choices) was computed. Those four values served as ment 2, the present results indicate that anticipation dependent variables in a 2 1 4 ANOVA with resolution condition of complete resolution does not enhance the attracand probability values as between-and within-subjects factors, retiveness of high-risk gambles in every choice between spectively. The analysis yielded a significant resolution effect (p õ a pair of gambles. For the pairs in which chances of .05), but no significant effect of probability value (p Å .38) or interaction (p Å .14).
being worse-off with the $ bet are substantially higher than chances of being worse-off with the P bet no sys-are less likely to generate cumulative wealth effects, which could influence preference among gambles. tematic effect of complete resolution was recorded.
Notwithstanding the above reservation, the results Discussion reported here demonstrate shifts in preference generated by changes in the extent of uncertainty resolution. All gains in the three experiments described above
The impact of uncertainty resolutions was not uniform were hypothetical. Subjects were not actually paid the across all gambles, however. It occurred mostly in gamamounts of money their chosen lotteries yielded. Thus, ble pairs which had nearly as high (or higher) probabiladmittedly, one should be cautious in extending the ity of being worse-off with the low-risk gamble (the P implications of the findings to real-life situations. Howbet) as with the high-risk one ($ bet). For those pairs, ever, several studies (e.g., Irwin, McClelland, & expectation of complete resolution, generated either by Schulze, 1992) demonstrated that laboratory experithe mechanism of resolution (Experiment 1), or by prior ments using hypothetical payoffs provide reasonable experience (Experiments 2 and 3) resulted in enhanced approximations for behavioral patterns with real monpreference for the high-risk option. Other gamble pairs, etary consequences. Furthermore, hypothetical payoffs which did not fall in the above category, did not show systematic effect of resolution (Experiment 3). The findings described above suggest that the resolu- tion effect is related to the anticipated experience of late that people are more likely to rely on a process of Set 2 3.5 3.5 comparing outcomes per state of the world if they ex-pect to learn what would have happened with each choice under uncertainty should strive to account for the distinction between situations in which one expects option. Hence, by this account, shifts in preference reflect a change in the decision process. The change in complete resolution of uncertainty, and other situations in which one does not expect uncertainty to be process involves a shift in reference points: When the outcome of the unchosen option is expected to be made completely resolved. Indeed, a separate research effort currently underway (Mellers, Schwarts, & Ritov, in known, it becomes a salient comparison point.
The present study does not preclude an alternative preparation) strives to develop a comprehensive model of choice and experienced outcomes, incorporating outaccount for the impact of anticipated resolution. By this account, choice between two gambles generally relies come knowledge of unselected options, when such outcome is available. on a process of comparison of outcomes in each state of the world. Hence a comparison of the obtained out-
